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In Re Turner (1867)
Introduction
The Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954)1
has been justifiably hailed as one of the most important decisions ever rendered by the
Supreme Court.2 Despite the fact that the Brown court obviously reached the correct
result, it has never been free of its detractors. Among its most prominent critics was
Herbert Wechsler, who was especially critical of the social science evidence used as a
partial basis for the decision.3 While it is likely that the Brown decision would have met
with hostility from most proponents of segregation regardless of its basis, the case would
rest on a much more sound footing if the Brown court had paid more attention to the
history of the Thirteenth Amendment and its accompanying case law.
In choosing to focus on the Fourteenth Amendment and the cases interpreting it,
the Brown court overlooked a great deal of evidence indicating that equal access to
education (and equal protection in general) was guaranteed to all citizens by the
Thirteenth Amendment. This evidence is found throughout the legislative history and
early case law interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment. In focusing on the Fourteenth
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Amendment as the basis for equal protection, the Brown court disregarded a number of
important cases that would have provided a stronger foundation for the decision.
Among the most important of these cases was In Re Turner (1867), a case decided
by Chief Justice Chase in his capacity as circuit judge. In Re Turner (1867) was decided
under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment and held that the Maryland
apprenticeship system for African-American children was unconstitutional because it did
contain the same provisions for educating African-American apprentices as were
applicable to white apprentices.4 In disregarding In Re Turner (1867), and other cases
decided under the Thirteenth Amendment, the Brown court effectively acted as if that
amendment had never been passed, or had only the most limited effect. Because of this, it
is interesting to compare In Re Turner (1867), with another case decided in Maryland that
dealt with the same law, Adeline Brown v. State (1865). Adeline Brown upheld the same
statute struck down in In Re Turner (1867), because it was decided by the Maryland
Court of Appeals prior to the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. Adeline Brown
makes a useful foil to In Re Turner and illustrates the fundamental importance of the
Thirteenth Amendment in securing equal protection to all United States citizens.
The 1954 reargument of the Brown decision focused on the “circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.”5 In searching for an
original interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Brown court considered the
legislative history, the ratification debates and the existing practices within the states.
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Having considered the views of “proponents and opponents of the Amendment,” the
court found that the historical sources were “At best… inconclusive.”6
In considering the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Brown
court gave equal weight to the views of proponents and opponents of the amendment. In
looking at both sides of the debate, the Brown court was no doubt being evenhanded, but
it hardly makes sense to give such great weight to the opinions of opponents of any piece
of legislation. If a group of persons are “antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the
Amendments,” it hardly seems logical to accept their interpretation of the law as being
just as valid as the opinions of those who enthusiastically support that law.7 If a law has
been passed, or an amendment has been ratified, it makes much more sense to look at the
views of those who supported the amendment as to what they thought it means, rather
than those who opposed it. This is especially important when one considers the typical
views of opponents and proponents of the amendment.
In House of Representatives Report No. 30, on the Bureau of Freedmen and
Refugees, Thomas D. Eliot, a Republican representative from Massachusetts, recorded a
typical attitude of Democratic politicians in regards to African-Americans. In the report,
Eliot recounted a recent incident that occurred when he was in New Orleans. On their
way to the statehouse, Eliot and a Democratic member of the State legislature happened
to walk past a school attended by African-American children. The children were playing
in the schoolyard as the two men passed by and Eliot noted:
He stopped and looked intently, then earnestly inquired, ‘Is this a school?’
‘Yes,’ I replied. ‘What! of niggers?’ ‘These are colored children,
evidently,’ I answered. ‘Well! Well!’ said he, and raising his hands, ‘I
have seen many an absurdity in my lifetime, but this is the climax of
6
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absurdities!’ I am sure that he did not speak from effect, but as he felt. He
left me abruptly, and turned the next corner to take his seat with legislators
similarly prejudiced.8
Eliot’s comments are especially useful because they deal explicitly with the education of
African-Americans and they are entirely typical of the attitudes of opponents of the Civil
War Amendments. Further examples of the attitudes of opponents of the Civil War
Amendments abound throughout the legislative history of those amendments.9 It is clear
from the legislative history that opponents of the Civil War Amendments were motivated
primarily by racism and a desire to maintain the regime of white supremacy.
The attitudes of proponents of the Civil War Amendments are much less rooted in
racism and are in general more principled than those of their opponents.10 In keeping with
their antislavery traditions, Republicans intended the Civil War Amendments to benefit
all Americans, regardless of color.11 Typical of the comments made by proponents of the
amendments, are those of John A. Bingham, a Republican Representative from Ohio.
During the course of debates on African-American suffrage in D.C., Bingham declared
that, “The spirit, the intent, the purpose of our Constitution is to secure equal and exact
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justice to all men.”12 This attitude is typical of proponents of the amendments and is seen
throughout the legislative history of the Civil War Amendments.
In considering the legislative history, the Brown court gave the same weight to the
racist attitudes of opponents of the Civil War Amendments as it did to the egalitarian
attitudes of proponents of those amendments. Moreover, in disregarding the Thirteenth
Amendment as a meaningful source of authority for their decision, the Brown court
amplified the power of opponents of the amendments by focusing on the cases decided
under the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Fourteenth Amendment is
today regarded as the most important of the Civil War Amendments, it was originally
intended merely as a supplement to the Thirteenth Amendment.13 The first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment laid out in explicit language the changes that had already been
wrought by the Thirteenth Amendment, thereby providing further support for the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.14 The clarification of the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment in §
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed opponents of equal rights and emancipation to
greatly narrow the meaning of the prior amendment.15 In focusing on the Fourteenth
Amendment and its accompanying case law, the Brown court greatly restricted the logical
basis for its opinion and made the segregationist’s case appear much stronger than it
should have been.
12
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Congress passed the Thirteenth Amendment on January 31, 1865, thereby
providing that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude would be permitted in the United
States.16 The passage of the Thirteenth Amendment marked the culmination of nearly
half a century of efforts by abolitionists to end the abominable and peculiar institution of
slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment had been hotly debated in both houses of Congress
and ultimately passed only because of careful political maneuvering by Lincoln and other
Republican leaders, who convinced sixteen retiring Democrats to support the amendment,
which passed 119 to 56.17
Despite this small measure of bipartisan support, news of its passage met with
very different receptions. According to the House reporter, “the members on the
Republican side of the House instantly sprang to their feet, and, regardless of
parliamentary rules, applauded with cheers and clapping of hands.”18 The audience in the
packed galleries, which included many African-Americans, “waved their hats and
cheered loud and long.”19 William Lloyd Garrison, abolitionist editor of The Liberator,
declared that they were celebrating the emancipation not only of four million AfricanAmericans, but thirty-four million whites as well.20
The immediate reaction of Democratic politicians and former slave owners does
not make the same impression on the historical record, but the vast majority of
Democrats continued to oppose equal rights for African-Americans. As the drafter of an
1872 Senate report noted, while commenting on the reports from the Army, the southern
16

Thirteenth Amendment – § 1 – Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction. – § 2 – Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
17
Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 2nd Session, (H.p. 531).
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Henry Mayer, All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery (New York, 1998), 576.

6

States were extremely reluctant to accept the change that the Thirteenth Amendment
brought about:
It appears from these reports that the whites were bitterly opposed to the
liberty of the freedmen, and only conceded their rights upon compulsion.
The opposition arose from a desire to hold on to them as property, or at
least control them as serfs, and from prejudice against every advance
toward equal rights. This feeling was almost universal…21
Opposition to the amendment was not limited to the South, but was also rampant among
Northern Democrats, fifty-six of whom had voted against the passage of the
amendment.22
Opposition to the Thirteenth Amendment continued in the former slave States
following the ratification of the amendment on December 6, 1865. Unwilling to concede
defeat, Democrats now passed “Black Codes” that denied African-Americans many of
their basic civil rights. As noted in Senate Report No. 41:
[Democratic] leaders met in convention and revised and remodeled
constitutions and enacted laws which disenfranchised and disqualified
more than three and one-half millions of citizens, and under pretense of
regulating their labor bound them to involuntary servitude in the name of
apprenticeship—a form of slavery which would have had many of the
evils of the old system without its compensations.23
In response to this State legislation, on December 13, 1866 Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment. Despite the
passage of the act, the oppressive State laws remained on the books and the newly freed
slaves required immediate assistance. Yet even as Federal judges and agents of the
Freedmen’s Bureau moved to alleviate the recently freed slaves’ condition, opponents of
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emancipation and equal rights for African-Americans denied that Congress had the
authority to pass the Civil Rights Act.
While Republican Congressmen began to prepare a fourteenth amendment to
clarify their interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, Federal and State judges were
forced to decide cases before them and render their own interpretation of the meaning and
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment. Two of the most important cases interpreting the
Thirteenth Amendment were decided in Maryland, In Re Turner (1867) in Federal court,
and Adeline Brown v. State (1865) in State court.24 These two cases arose from
challenges to the Maryland apprenticeship law, which was enacted after the abolition of
slavery to control African-American labor.
When analyzed and compared alongside one another, In Re Turner and Adeline
Brown v. State demonstrate two very different views of the scope and meaning of the
Thirteenth Amendment at the time of its enactment. When viewed in light of
contemporary Congressional records, it is clear that In Re Turner, written by Chief
Justice Chase in his capacity as circuit judge, is a proper interpretation of the scope and
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment in regard to the issues before the court. Chase’s
opinion is consistent his arguments in earlier cases, such as “Matilda’s Case” or State v.
Birney (1838). Chase’s opinion is also consistent with the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as they were intended to be applied by their
supporters.
Adeline Brown v. State, on the other hand, is a reactionary opinion that attempts to
act as if nothing substantial had been changed by emancipation. Because the opinion was
issued approximately one month before the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, Adeline
24
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Brown v. State treats the question of whether an African-American apprenticeship law is
valid as entirely a question of State law. Adeline Brown v. State is reactionary because it
goes out of its way to justify a law that clearly violated contemporary standards of equal
protection.
The Thirteenth Amendment was intended to not only abolish slavery, but also to
overturn that part of the Supreme Court’s holding in Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) that
denied that African-Americans could be citizens of the United States and were
consequently not entitled to the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship.
Because it was silent on the issue, it is clear that the Thirteenth Amendment changed
nothing in regard to those masterful portions of Dred Scott in which Taney laid out the
privileges and immunities of United States citizens. A proper interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment indicates that it was intended to extend even further than
eradicating slavery and the badges and incidents of slavery.25 Rather, to the men who
supported the amendment, in Congress and in the courts, the Thirteenth Amendment gave
them the authority to totally reorganize the political system throughout the former slave
States to provide for a republican form of government for all citizens.26 Thus, while The
Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) treated all of the Civil War Amendments as applying only
to African-Americans, it is clear that Congress intended the Thirteenth Amendment to
provide protections for all Americans, regardless of race or color.
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It is no accident that these two cases arose in courts in Maryland. According to
reports from the Freedmen’s Bureau and the statements made in Congress, the condition
of freedmen in Maryland was particularly oppressive. The Freedmen’s Bureau records
list dozens of African-American men and women who were beaten or killed for the most
trifling or imagined offenses.27 In the opinion of Thaddeus Stevens, a Republican
representative from Pennsylvania, “Maryland although near to the free States in
geographical position, [was] more bitterly imbued with the old virus of slavery than any
of the southern States that have been conquered.”28
Stevens stated that in his opinion the reason for this was that the electoral system
in Maryland gave an enormous advantage to the plantation region of the Eastern Shore.
Stevens declared “in the State of Maryland one hundred thousand white men, in that
portion of the State where the slave population formerly abounded, exercise equal
political power with six hundred thousand in the free portion of the State.”29 Stevens
urged the House to find a way to rectify this situation and restore Maryland to a
republican form of government, in accordance with Congress’ powers under Article IV, §
4 of the Constitution. Thus we see that Congress was very mindful not only of the need to
legislate for the protection of the freedmen, but also to legislate for the good of white
citizens.
Stevens and other Republican leaders saw themselves as restoring a republican
form of government to all citizens by ensuring that all persons had equal rights and equal
protection of the law. While this attitude was characterized as radical by opponents of
emancipation and equal rights, the Republicans who drafted the Thirteenth Amendment
27
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and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were actually quite conservative in their ideology. The
Republicans added no new rights to the bill of rights, nor did they invent any new legal
principles. Rather, they simply declared that equal protection of the laws must apply to
everyone, regardless of race or color. In stating this, the Republicans were acting in the
best traditions of classical republicanism, the dominant ideology in England and the
United States since at least the early seventeenth century.30
The Maryland Apprenticeship Law
The Maryland apprenticeship laws at issue in In Re Turner and Adeline Brown v.
State were typical of laws passed in all of the former slave States following
emancipation. Moreover, they were precisely the kind of laws that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 was designed to do away with. The Maryland apprenticeship law was enacted
following the drafting of a new Maryland constitution in 1864. That constitution, which
went into effect November 1, 1864, abolished slavery.31 In addition to abolishing slavery,
the Maryland constitution of 1864 provided for establishing a new apprenticeship system
for African-Americans. Furthermore, the Maryland legislature also established new
penalties for African-Americans convicted of crimes. Under the new laws, AfricanAmericans could be bound out to hard labor in accordance with the exception in the
constitution for involuntary servitude.32
On December 19, 1866, only six days after the passage of the act, Robert Schenck
of Ohio submitted a resolution to the House of Representatives in which he noted that
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African-Americans were being sold into slavery for the commission of crimes in
Maryland, allegedly in accordance with the exception in the Thirteenth Amendment.33
During the discussion following this resolution, Thaddeus Stevens noted that Maryland
was “not the only State of the South that under the exception I have mentioned has taken
occasion to pass laws providing for selling freedmen into slavery.”34 All of the
Republican speakers on this topic were clearly of the opinion that this law violated the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.
On January 3, 1867, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts brought this same
advertisement to the attention of the Senate. Sumner noted that this was not the only
instance of this outrage, but cited several more examples from Maryland.35 Senator
Reverdy Johnson, a Democrat from Maryland, attempted to defend his State’s record on
slavery, declaring:
… that perhaps there was no State in the Union in which there is a more
fixed determination that slavery, in the common acceptation of the term,
slavery of the innocent, slavery on account of color, slavery on any
account except for crime, shall not exist in Maryland.36
Johnson’s assertions notwithstanding, Senator Thomas Fessenden of Maine pointed out
that this law did not extend the punishment of slavery for conviction of crime to white
persons, but that it only applied to African-Americans.37 In the face of this point, even
Johnson, who had been the winning attorney in Dred Scott, was forced to concede:
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If there be a distinction between black and white with reference to this
kind of punishment, I have no doubt the Legislature will promptly correct
it—I am sure they ought to do so—or if they do not, then the question will
arise whether it does not fall within the inhibition of the civil rights bill,
and whether the courts will enforce that measure.38
As seen from Johnson’s statements, equal protection was clearly an issue for Congress as
they dealt with the issues brought about by emancipation.
Moreover, the Senate debates make it clear that an involuntary servitude was
impermissible if the person was bound out for service to an individual by way of
punishment. During the course of this same debate, Senator John A. Creswell, a
Republican from Maryland, noted that involuntary servitude in punishment for a crime,
was “never intended to authorize any individual, by reason of a decree of court or a
public sale, to hold any other human being in bondage.”39
It is quite clear that Congress was well aware of conditions in Maryland at the
time that they passed the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Supporters and opponents of those acts clearly understood what they meant for equal
protection, emancipation and labor conditions in the future. The future of those acts
would now rest with the courts.
In Re Turner (1867)
In Re Turner arose from a habeas corpus petition brought by Elizabeth Turner, a
young African-American woman from Talbot County, Maryland, in alleged
contravention of the Constitution and laws of the United States. Turner and her mother
were owned by Mr. Hambleton prior to the abolition of slavery in Maryland in 1864.
Almost immediately after her emancipation Elizabeth Turner was apprenticed to
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Hambleton by an indenture dated November 3, two days after the new constitution went
into operation. Thus, having been freed for less than two days, Turner was once more
bound to her former master.40 According to the terms of her indenture, Elizabeth was to
be “taught the art or calling of a house servant,” but she was not entitled to any further
education or training.41
On September 20, 1867, Turner’s mother’s new husband, Charles Henry Minoky,
filed a habeas corpus petition on her behalf in the Federal Circuit court for the district of
Maryland, presided over by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase. During the 1830s, Chase had
made a name for himself representing fugitive slaves in Ohio. Chase represented these
clients pro bono and became known as the “Attorney General of Fugitive Slaves.” The
most important of these cases were “Matilda’s Case” and Birney v. State (1838). It is
extremely unlikely that Minoky could have found a more reasonable or favorable court in
which to file his petition.
Like many other abolitionists, Chase drew much of his inspiration from the
Declaration of Independence, from which he derived the self-evident axiom that all men
are born “equally free.”42 Unlike William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips, who
condemned the Constitution as a pact with the devil, Chase never gave up on the U.S.
Constitution as a source of freedom and protection for all.43 Rather, he found a
declaration of positive rights for all citizens in the Bill of Rights, especially in the Fifth
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Amendment’s protection of life, liberty and property.44 In taking this stance, Chase
heaped contempt upon decisions such as Corfield v. Coryell (1823) and Barron v.
Baltimore (1833), which narrowly defined the protections of the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights and maintained that they applied only against the Federal government.45
Although Chase was an advocate of full legal equality for African-Americans, he was
probably not in favor of total racial equality. Indeed, like many antislavery activists, he
was opposed to slavery because it threatened everyone’s rights, not just those of AfricanAmericans.46
In filing the petition for habeas corpus, Minoky was assisted by two attorneys
from the Freedmen’s Bureau, Henry Stockbridge and Nathan M. Pusey.47 Of these two
lawyers, Stockbridge appears to have exercised the dominant role during the two-day
hearing. Indeed, Stockbridge was a central figure in the case; he presented not only
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arguments on behalf of Turner, but also presented the opposing arguments because
Hambleton refused to hire an attorney (and then refuted them).48
The strongest argument in support of Hambleton’s position was that Turner had
been apprenticed prior to the passage of the 13th Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 should not apply retroactively. Stockbridge
refuted this argument by noting that the 13th Amendment was self-executing and that the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 was designed to remedy existing wrongs, not merely
prospective ones. Under questioning from Chase, Stockbridge acknowledged that many
State laws prior to the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment made distinctions between
“the white ruling race, and the black subject one.” Stockbridge noted that under
Maryland’s pre-emancipation laws, “the free negro, while having no political rights, was
entitled to civil or legal rights to a large degree, but not equally with whites.”49
Stockbridge made two primary arguments in support of Turner’s habeas corpus
petition. Stockbridge’s primary argument was that Elizabeth Turner’s apprenticeship
constituted an involuntary servitude and was consequently prohibited by the Thirteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Maryland constitution. Stockbridge
argued that the apprenticeship was merely an evasion of the constitutional amendment
prohibiting slavery. 50
Stockbridge’s second. argument centered on the fact that Hambleton, as master,
was not bound by the indenture to give Turner any education, in reading, writing, and
arithmetic; all of which were required in the case of the binding of white children.
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Because it thus treated African-American children differently than white children,
Stockbridge argued that it was invalid as being in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.51 Stockbridge also argued that Turner was liable to be
assigned and transferred at the will of her master to any person in the same county; while
a white apprentice was not so liable. Finally, the authority of the master over the
apprentice was described in the law as a "property and interest;" and no such description
is applied to authority over a white apprentice.52
This was not the first time that Stockbridge had made this argument. In 1864,
Stockbridge had been a member of the Maryland legislature, where he led the movement
to call the constitutional convention that ended slavery in that State. During the course of
the convention debates, Stockbridge opposed the adoption of the section that authorized
the African-American apprenticeship program. Failing that, Stockbridge proposed an
amendment that would have required “all masters to whom any such apprentice shall be
indentured, to cause said apprentice to be taught to read and write; and any violation of
which obligation on the part of any master shall cancel the indenture of apprenticeship.”53
This language would have made the rules pertaining to African-American apprentices the
same as those applying to white apprentices. Stockbridge argued that if the law treated
African-American children differently than white children, than it constituted a special
law and was therefore unconstitutional. Mr. Stockbridge’s amendment was not accepted.
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After hearing Stockbridge’s arguments, Chase rendered his decision in favor of
Turner. Rather than writing a lengthy opinion, Chase contented himself with a brief
statement of conclusions, which seemed to him to be sound law:
1. The first clause of the thirteenth amendment to the constitution of the
United States interdicts slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, and establishes freedom as the constitutional right
of all persons in the United States.
2. The alleged apprenticeship in the present case is involuntary servitude,
within the meaning of these words in the amendment.
3. If this were otherwise, the indenture set forth in the return does not
contain important provisions for the security and benefit of the apprentice
which are required by the laws of Maryland in indenture of white
apprentices, and is, therefore, in contravention of that clause of the first
section of the civil rights law enacted by congress on April 9, 1866, which
assures to all citizens without regard to race or color, “full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens.”
4. This law having been enacted under the second clause of the thirteenth
amendment, in enforcement of the first clause of the same amendment, is
constitutional, and applies to all conditions prohibited by it, whether
originating in transactions before or since its enactment.
5. Colored persons equally with white persons are citizens of the United
States.54
Based on these five conclusions, Chase ruled that Hambleton must discharge Turner from
restraint. While not all of his contemporaries would have agreed with Chase’s
conclusions, nearly everyone in favor of emancipation and equal rights would have
supported them.
Chase’s first proposition, while it at first appears to simply mirror the exact text of
the Thirteenth Amendment, was actually quite a contentious point. In stating that the
amendment “establishes freedom as the constitutional right of all persons in the United
States,” Chase was declaring that the Thirteenth Amendment guaranteed positive rights to
the individual. Chase’s conclusion therefore ran contrary to the antebellum interpretation
54
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of the rest of the Bill of Rights, that it provided no positive rights to the individual, but
merely prevented government from doing a certain action.55 Strict textualists steeped in
the Calhoun tradition might have argued vociferously against Chase’s interpretation, but
most of his contemporaries would probably have agreed with him or conceded the point.
Indeed, even in The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), Justice Miller would write that
the Thirteenth Amendment was a “grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom
of all the human race within the jurisdiction of this government.”56 Chase’s Republican
contemporaries in Congress would also have agreed with his statement. During the
debates on the Civil Right Act of 1866, James F. Wilson, a representative from Iowa,
would declare that the end of the amendment is “the maintenance of freedom to the
citizen.”57 In keeping with this line of reasoning, the principles of classical republicanism
would have authorized Congress to pass laws allowing citizens to maintain their free and
independent status. This is precisely what Congress intended to do in passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.58
Chase’s second contention, that the apprenticeship in question constituted an
involuntary servitude was also at least somewhat controversial. The point most in
Chase’s favor was the conditions under which Turner had been apprenticed. In the
opinion, Chase noted that soon after the abolition of slavery, “many of the freed people of
Talbot county were collected together under some local authority, the nature of which
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does not clearly appear, and the younger persons were bound as apprentices, usually, if
not always, to their late masters.”59 Turner was among those apprenticed under these
circumstances. This state of affairs certainly cast doubt upon whether Turner’s mother
had actually voluntarily committed Turner to the apprenticeship.
The Congressional Record also makes it clear that Congressional Republicans
would have agreed with his characterization of the apprenticeship as involuntary. During
the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, George W. Julian, a representative from
Indiana, noted that many of the former slave States authorized that, “A magistrate may
take colored children and apprentice them for alleged misbehavior without consulting the
parents.”60 In Julian’s opinion, and surely in the opinion of many others supportive of
emancipation and equal rights, this clearly constituted an involuntary servitude.
Chase’s third conclusion stated that the apprenticeship was invalid because it did
not meet the requirements called for by the law pertaining to white children. Chase noted
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed all persons the “full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens.”61 No one could really argue with this statement, but they could deny Chase’s
fourth conclusion, that the Thirteenth Amendment provided sufficient authority to pass
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. While this was the consensus opinion among most
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Republicans, many Southerners and a substantial number of Northern Democrats
probably disagreed with it.62 Doubts as to whether courts would agree that Congress had
the authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were
the prime motives in proposing the Fourteenth Amendment. With that said, it was clear
the proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 intended it to apply retroactively and
address existing grievances.63
Chase’s fifth contention, that African-Americans were citizens of the United
States would also have aroused some degree of opposition. Indeed, only ten years earlier
Roger B. Taney had written in Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) that African-Americans
could not be citizens of the United States.64 This argument would soon become moot with
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, but in the meantime a strong conservative
argument existed to support Chase’s assertion that African-Americans were citizens of
the United States.
The assumption in Dred Scott that African-Americans could not be citizens rested
upon the classical republican division of society into two classes—slaves and citizens.
The American conception of classical republican ideology held that only intelligent,
economically independent, arms bearing, Protestant, adult males were able to exercise
their free will and make decisions without the improper influence of others. Therefore,
they alone possessed full civil and political rights, which ensured their status as citizens
and allowed them a part in the decision-making processes of government. In the classical
republican conception, all those who lacked the independence required to function as
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citizens were slaves, at least metaphorically if not literally. This tenet of classical
republican ideology spawned two arguments for granting African-Americans citizenship
under the Thirteenth Amendment.
The first argument began from the premise that the world was divided into
citizens and slaves. Once slavery was abolished, it naturally followed that the freed slaves
were now citizens. This argument was made by Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan
during the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Howard declared that the intention of
the Thirteenth Amendment was make everyone “the opposite of a slave, to make him a
freeman.” Howard went to declare that “The once slave is no longer a slave; he has
become, by means of emancipation, a free man. If such be the case, then in all common
sense is he not entitled to those rights which we concede to a man who is free?”65
The second argument supporting the notion that the Thirteenth Amendment made
the freedmen into citizens stemmed from the classical republican emphasis on military
service as a prerequisite for citizenship. This theory was clearly current during the
debates on the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Daniel Clark of New Hampshire
argued that the Constitution was irrelevant for determining the citizenship status of
African-Americans on the grounds of classical republican ideology. When closely
questioned by Garrett Davis of Kentucky, Clark declared that African-Americans had
possessed the rights of full citizens even before the Constitution, and that they became
citizens when they, “helped to achieve the independence of the country equally with the
white man.”66 This argument was fully in accordance with classical republican theory,
which held that citizens gained their rights through the possession of the necessary
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attributes for citizenship, not because governments chose to bestow those rights upon
them.67
While Chase’s opinion probably found little support among antagonists of
emancipation and equal rights for African-Americans, it was by no means a radical
opinion. The decision was firmly grounded in contemporary Republican notions
concerning the scope and extent of the Thirteenth Amendment. Moreover, the decision
was widely accepted as good law during the 1860 and 1870s. In Re Turner was praised
by Republican speakers in Congress. In 1874, William Lawrence, a representative from
Ohio, noted that the “power of Congress to enact the civil-rights bill… [was] settled by
the reasoning and authority of adjudicated cases and elementary writers.”68 In Re Turner
was among the cases cited by Lawrence in support of this proposition.
In Re Turner was also largely accepted by the vast majority of Federal and State
judges who heard cases arising from the Thirteenth Amendment.69 Among the other
important cases, by far the most important was Justice Noah Swayne’s opinion in United
States v. Rhodes (1866). Swayne decided this case acting in his capacity as circuit judge
for Kentucky. In Rhodes, Swayne decided that Kentucky’s law barring the testimony of
an African-American woman in the prosecution of a white vigilante violated the 13th
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.70
Adeline Brown v. State (1865)
This case involves the conviction of Adeline Brown for having unlawfully enticed
and persuaded an African-American apprentice, named George Brown, to run away from
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the service of his master, Lancelot Warfield, Jr. Adeline Brown was found guilty in trial
court of violating Md. Code, Pub. Gen. Laws Art. VI, §§ 31-40, which allowed the courts
to order an African-American child to be apprenticed to a white person.71 She then
appealed to the Court of Appeals. Brown argued that the law allowing the court to order
an African-American child to be apprenticed to a white person violated Maryland
constitutional

provisions

outlawing

involuntary

servitude

and

was

further

unconstitutional because it was a special law.72 The Court of Appeals rejected both of
these arguments in a rather cursory opinion written by Judge Daniel Weisel.
The Court of Appeals rejected Brown’s first argument by stating that an
apprenticeship had never been considered either slavery or an involuntary servitude.73
While this may have been technically true, the Court did not inquire into the
circumstances under which the apprenticeship contract was made. Weisel’s opinion
simply states the prior precedents in conclusive terms, without any inquiry into the facts
of the case. In many instances the conditions under which such apprenticeships were
made can only be regarded with horror. One freedman, Basil Croudy, and his wife were
brought before the Calvert County orphans’ court in order to agree to the indenture of
their three children. The Croudys “steadily refused to consent to the binding.” The
constable, irritated by their intransigence, and “finding the mother obstinate, and deaf to
reason… struck her in the face with his fist in the presence of the Judges.”74 While we do
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not know the circumstances under which this apprenticeship was made, it is likely to
have been done under less than optimal circumstances.
Having made no effort to inquire into the conditions under which the
apprenticeship was imposed, Weisel next rejected Brown’s argument that the law in
question was a special law. Once again, Weisel made no attempt to compare the law
relating to African-American apprentices with the law relating to white apprentices.
Rather, Weisel concluded that the law was not a special law, despite the fact that it was
different from the law that previously existed for white apprentices. Weisel seems to have
considered it perfectly reasonable that a law would treat white apprentices differently
than African-American children.75 Weisel’s brief opinion therefore reflects a typical
attitude of an opponent of equal rights and emancipation.
Conclusion
Weisel’s opinion in Adeline Brown v. State (1865) preceded the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment, so it is hardly surprising to see such a recalcitrant and obtuse
interpretation of the meaning of freedom and emancipation. Adeline Brown (1865)
underscores the fundamental importance of the Thirteenth Amendment in guaranteeing
equal protection to all persons, because it clearly demonstrates the ease with which State
courts could disregard the true meaning of freedom within their own jurisdiction. With
the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and the passage of its explanatory Civil
Rights Act of 1866, State courts should have no longer been able to construe the law in
as well. Note that Chase’s opinion in In Re Turner (1867) did note that the indenture was made under
suspicious circumstances.
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the manner in which they did. That they were able to do so for almost another century
before the Federal government intervened is a testament to the power of the opposition to
equality and freedom for all within the United States.
This opposition to freedom and equality was given an unequal voice in Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka (1954), although the Brown (1954) court ultimately
rejected segregation and separate but equal. In choosing to focus on the Fourteenth
Amendment and the cases interpreting it, in the Supreme Court overlooked In Re Turner
(1867), a case that would have provided some much needed legal support for the opinion.
In Re Turner (1867) held that the Maryland apprenticeship system for African-American
children was unconstitutional because it did contain the same provisions for educating
African-American apprentices as were applicable to white apprentices. In Re Turner
(1867) was entirely consistent with the views of supporters of the Civil War
Amendments, who clearly intended those amendments to provide positive guarantees of
rights to all Americans.
In basing their opinion on race-specific social science data, rather than a colorblind legal analysis, the Brown (1954) court undermined the strength of its own argument
and further catalyzed opposition to segregation. Moreover, the Brown (1954) court
seemed to concede that history was not on their side, when it fact it was soundly in
support of the opinion. If the law is going to change the opinions of Americans, as C.
Vann Woodward suggested, it is important that the Civil War Amendments be interpreted
as their supporters intended: with an understanding that they are designed to provide
freedom equal protection without regard to skin color, that they protect the rights of all
Americans and that they do not countenance special legislation.
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In disregarding In Re Turner (1867), and other cases decided under the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Brown court effectively acted as if that amendment had never been
passed, or had only the most limited effect. The true effect of the Thirteenth Amendment
is clearly demonstrated by cases such as Adeline Brown v. State (1865). Adeline Brown
(1865) upheld the same statute struck down in In Re Turner (1867), because it was
decided by the Maryland Court of Appeals prior to the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment. In Adeline Brown (1865), the Court of Appeals upheld a statute that did not
even meet contemporary standards of “special legislation” jurisprudence, in as much as it
explicitly treated one class differently than another without any justification whatsoever.
Contemporary supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment clearly would have
rejected both the reasoning and the result in Adeline Brown (1865), as Justice Chase did
in In Re Turner (1867). The Congressional Record clearly shows that supporters of the
Thirteenth Amendment intended it to guarantee the protections of the Bill of Rights to all
citizens, regardless of race or color. In his opinion in In Re Turner (1867), Chase
understood and correctly applied their intention. Contemporary arguments in favor of
incorporating the Bill of Rights would do well to look to the support provided for total
incorporation via the Thirteenth Amendment. The Congressional Record and the
jurisprudence contemporary with the Thirteenth Amendment clearly indicate that this was
the goal of supporters of that amendment.
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